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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Public Service Commission of Utah ("PSCU") 
properly dismissed the application of American Paging, Inc. of 
Utah ("American Paging") for a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity to operate one-way paging service for the 
reason that the PSCU lacks regulatory jurisdiction over one-way 
paging services? 
II. Whether the PSCU properly complied with the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code ^nn. § 63-46a-l (1985) 
et seq. by issuing Rule No. 8304, which interprets the Commis-
sion's lack of statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging 
services? 
III. Whether the Public Telecommunications Utility Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l (1985) et seg. affects the PSCU's lack 
of statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging? 
IV. Whether PSCU Rule No. 8304 affects the constitutional 
due process rights of former one-way pagihg certificate holders? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutory provisions relevant to a determinative 
resolution of the present case are: (1) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986), attached as!Addendum A; (2) Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(2) and (3) (1985), attached as Addendum B; 
and (3) S.B. No. 102, Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l et seg. (1985), 
attached as Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Certiorari brought by David R. 
Williams d/b/a Industrial Communications ("Industrial") seeking 
review of PSCU Rule No. 8304 and of the PSCU's Order issued in 
Case No. 85-2007-01 based upon an alleged failure to comply 
with proper Rulemaking procedures. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the PSCU has a history of acceding to requests for 
certificates of authority to operate one-way paging 
services,1 the PSCU did not ever interpret the scope of its 
statutory jurisdiction relative to one-way paging services 
until 1983. (R. at 236-37.) The prior unwitting grant of 
one-way paging authority under the guise of certificates of 
authority did not constitute an interpretation of jurisdiction, 
but rather, was simply an assent to requests for certificates 
of convenience and necessity. Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 720 P.2d 773, 774 
In a summary of the history of PSCU accession to requests 
for certificates of authority to operate one-way paging 
services, this Court noted that the PSCU "assumed" juris-
diction over one-way and two-way paging by granting certi-
ficates of public convenience and necessity to 4 dual 
services companies and one single authority company. On 
other occasions, the PSCU denied requests for certifi-
cates. Thus, the PSCU granted a total of 5 certificates, 
only one of which was a single authority certificate 
granting authority to operate a one-way paging service. 
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, 774 
(Utah 1986) . 
- ? -
(Utah 1986). A copy of the Williams case is attached as 
Addendum D. 
In May of 1983, American Paging Inc. of Utah ("American 
Paging") contacted the PSCU to inquire whether American Paging 
could operate a commercial one-way paging system without a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity. Pursuant to 
its determination that no certificate is required, the PSCU 
informed American Paging in a letter dated June 3, 1983, that 
the PSCU has no statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging 
services. Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 720 
P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1986) . 
Later in 1983, Page America, Inc., another paging company, 
filed an application with the PSCU to provide one-way paging 
service. On November 28, 1983, after a full hearing and 
receipt of extensive argument on the issue, the PSCU ruled that 
it had no statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging and 
dismissed the Page America application. !The PSCU's dismissal 
of the Page America Application was subsequently appealed to 
the Utah Supreme Court. (R. at 235-37.) A copy of the Page 
America decision and order is attached as Addendum E. 
On April 30, 1985, while the Wi1liams case was still 
pending, American Paging filed an application with the PSCU to 
obtain authority to provide one-way paging service to the 
general public. American Paging simultaneously filed a motion 
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to dismiss its application for the reason that the PSCU, in its 
Order of November 28, 1983, determined that it did not have 
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services. The PSCU 
granted American Paging's motion reaffirming its prior juris-
dictional determination and, in addition, concluded that the 
1985 Utah Legislature's addition of Chapter 8b to the Utah 
Public Utilities Act did not expand the PSCU's statutory 
jurisdiction beyond that previously held; thus, the PSCU still 
did not have jurisdiction over one-way paging. (R. at 236-37.) 
On March 4, 1986, this Court ruled in Williams that the 
PSCU failed to adhere to proper rulemaking requirements when 
interpreting the scope of its jurisdiction over one-way pag-
ing. Accordingly, this Court remanded the matter for further 
rulemaking proceedings which would comport with the applicable 
procedural requirements of the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(R. at 236-37, and Williams, 720 P.2d at 773-74.) 
Pursuant to this Court's direction in Williams, the PSCU 
filed a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Office of 
Administrative Rules. (R. at 20.) A copy of Rule 8304 and the 
signed recommendation that it be adopted are attached as 
Addendum F. Notice of the proposed Rule was published in the 
Utah Bulletin on April 15, 1986, stating that the Commission 
does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging and the reasons 
for such rule. Notice was provided to the parties, and no 
party requested a hearing on the rule within the fifteen day 
period following publication of the propdsed rule as required 
by the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. Industrial did, 
however, file its written objection to the Rule. The juris-
dictional Rule was then formally adopted and made effective 
May 16, 1986. (R. at 20 and 236-42). 
On May 23, 1986, the PSCU issued its Order granting 
American Paging's motion to dismiss its application for a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity because the 
PSCU lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging services. The PSCU 
determined that American Paging should be allowed to provide 
one-way paging services to the citizens of Utah because of Rule 
8304, issued pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act 
and in accordance with the directions of this Court. The PSCU 
further concluded that the provisions of Chapter 8b of the 
Public Utilities Act did not expand the jurisdiction of the 
PSCU to include one-way paging. Thus, there was no attempt to 
deregulate one-way paging under Chapter 8b of the Public 
Utilities Act; the PSCU simply interpreted its lack of statu-
tory jurisdiction pursuant to administrative rulemaking proce-
dures as described by this Court in the Williams decision. (R. 
at 235-37.) A copy of PSCU Order Granting Motion to Dismiss is 
attached as Addendum G. 
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On June 13, 1986, David R. Williams d/b/a Industrial 
Communications ("Industrial") petitioned this Court for review 
of the PSCU's adoption of Rule 8304. On the same day, Indus-
trial petitioned this Court for review of the PSCU Order 
granting American Paging's motion to dismiss its application 
for certificate of public convenience and necessity. (R. at 
265-66.) The two said petitions are now consolidated for 
review by this court as Supreme Court Case Nos. 860313 and 
860314. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
PSCU LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER ONE-WAY PAGING: Based upon 
its experience and expert knowledge in the field of utilities 
regulation, the PSCU, through Rule 8304, determined that it 
lacks regulatory jurisdiction over one-way paging services. 
The PSCU's statutory interpretation is correct because: (1) 
the PSCU never engaged in deregulation proceedings, but rather, 
interpreted its lack of jurisdiction over one-way paging 
through rulemaking; (2) one-way paging does not fall within the 
Public Utilities Act, Chapter 2 definitions of utilities 
services which are subject to PSCU regulatory jurisdiction; (3) 
a history of infrequent PSCU accession to requests for certifi-
cates of authority cannot create jurisdiction in violation of 
legislative enactments; and finally (4) the great weight of 
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case authority demonstrates that one-way paging services are 
not public utilities services and are not subject to PSCU 
regulatory jurisdiction under relevant Utah statutes. 
PSCU COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS: The PSCU, in 
accord with the instruction of the Utah Supreme Court, properly 
interpreted its lack of statutory jurisdiction over one-way 
paging pursuant to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. The 
PSCU did not engage in exemption proceedings under Chapter 8b 
of the Telecommunications Act; rather, the PSCU complied with 
and fulfilled all judicial, legislative and procedural require-
ments of the Administrative Rulemaking Act in determining that 
the PSCU lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging services. 
CHAPTER 8b OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT DOES NOT ENLARGE 
PSCU JURISDICTION: Consistent with a policy of regulatory 
restraint, Chapter 8b of the Telecommunications Utility Act 
does not "enlarge or reduce" the PSCU's previously held 
jurisdiction. Therefore, the unambiguous language of the Act 
itself clearly demonstrates that Chapter 8b does not affect the 
PSCU's lack of regulatory jurisdiction over one-way paging. 
Departure from the literal meaning of the Act would result in 
unjust and absurd over-regulation of non-utilities, incon-
sistent with the purposes and policies of PSCU regulation of 
public utilities. 
PSCU RULE 8304 DOES NOT VIOLATE INDUSTRIAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS: PSCU Rule 8304 does not constitute a 
government interference with Industrial's property interests. 
Because the primary expectation of Industrial's property 
interest (a PSCU certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity) is the authority to operate a one-way paging service, 
Rule 8304 not only leaves Industrial's property interest 
undisturbed, but it also relieves Industrial from the burden o 
any state government regulation or interference. Thus, PSCU 
Rule 8304 is constitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PSCU PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT IT HAS NO 
STATUTORY JURISDICTION TO REGULATE ONE-WAY 
PAGING SERVICES. 
A. The PSCU Was Justified In Interpreting Its Lack of 
Statutory Authority To Regulate One Way Paging And 
Should Not Be Estopped From Making Such Interpretatio 
In Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2 
781, 784 (1965), this Court stated the applicable standard of 
review governing PSCU interpretation of the Public Utilities 
Act: 
[T]he interpretation and application of statutes 
adopted by the administrative agency is usually looked 
upon with some indulgence. It is both just and 
practical that the Board should be allowed consider-
able latitude of discretion in deciding what policies 
will best carry out the responsibilities imposed upon 
it. Due to the consideration just stated, and because 
of its experience and presumed expert knowledge in its 
field, an administrative interpretation and applica-
tion of a statute, although not necessarily control-
ling, is generally regarded as prima facie correct and 
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should not to be overturned so long as it is in 
conformity with the general objectives the agency is 
charged with carrying out, and there is a rational 
basis for it in the provisions of law. 
See also PBI Freight Service v. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 598 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Utah 1979). 
In disregard of the applicable standard of review, the 
experience and expert knowledge of the PSCU and the weight of 
current case authority, Industrial urges this court to overturn 
PSCU Rule No. 8304 and cites as authority Husky Oil Company of 
Delaware v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 
1976). However, an analysis of the jurisdictional issue in the 
instant case demonstrates that the Husky decision is not 
applicable, Rule 8304 was created in conformity with the 
general objectives of the PSCU, and Rule 8304 is based upon 
sound legal principles. 
First, the Husky decision concerned a radical departure 
from a specific administrative rule upon which the public had 
relied and which was consistently followed. In the instant 
case, there is no such radical departure from an administrative 
rule because the PSCU has never ruled that it has jurisdiction 
over one-way paging services. Furthermore, the PSCU's acces-
sion to requests for certificates of authority to operate 
one-way paging services was mostly incidental. The facts 
reflect that the PSCU's mere consent to grant certain requests 
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for certificates of authority to operate one-way services was 
only sporadic, and was actually an unwitting violation of 
statutory authority. Indeed, the PSCU granted only one 
requested certificate that covered only one-way paging. 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 774. 
Prior to 1983, neither the PSCU nor the Courts had ever 
specifically interpreted the PSCU's statutory jurisdiction over 
commercially offered one-way paging. See Argument infra at 
Point IIA(l). It is important to note that with respect to the 
subject jurisdictional issue, this Court has held in circum-
stances in which a state agency interprets the application of 
statute imposed upon it that such agency is entitled to "con-
siderable latitude of discretion" and that "considerations of 
policy are primarily the responsibility of the Commission." 
P.B.I. Freight Service, 598 P.2d at 1354. 
The Husky decision is also distinguished from the instant 
case for the reason that in Husky, the State Tax Commission had 
actually promulgated formal Regulation S-38 in 1937, exempting 
certain sales transactions from taxation. Later in 1971, the 
State Tax Commission deleted the exemption from the regulation 
and added language making the previously exempted transactions 
taxable. Husky, 556 P.2d at 1270. In addition, two Supreme 
Court decisions acknowledged the validity of the 1937 S-38 
exemption regulation and its impact on relevant statutes. Id. 
-10-
The instant case is not comparable. First, the PSCU never 
articulated a formal rule or statement respecting jurisdiction 
over one-way paging prior to 1983. Thus, the PSCU did not 
depart from any prior determination, but rather, conformed to 
its 1983 statutory interpretation of jurisdiction. Addition-
ally, this court has never acknowledged or upheld PSCU asser-
tion of jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging. This 
Court even made mention of the fact that it has never addressed 
the substantive issue of whether the Public Utilities Act gives 
the PSCU jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging services. 
In Medi-Call, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 
273, 470 P.2d 258, 260-261 (1970); this court held that it: 
did not reach the issue of whether a publicly avail-
able paging service, . . . would be a public utility 
because [its] holding was limited to the private 
nature of arrangements before [it]. 
However, the majority of other jurisdictions that have 
addressed this specific issue have held that one-way paging 
services do not constitute a public utility service and should 
not be subject to regulation. 44 A.L.R.4th 216, 220-222 (1986). 
Second, because one-way paging is not a public utility 
under the Chapter 2 definitions of the Public Utilities Act, 
the PSCU cannot regulate it regardless of any unwitting 
historical regulation. Under the definitions of Chapter 2 of 
the Utah Public Utilities Act, the PSCU either has jurisdiction 
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or it does not have jurisdiction. The PSCU cannot acquire or 
create statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging which the 
legislature did not give it, simply by the unwitting assumption 
thereof. To hold otherwise makes statutory jurisdiction mean-
ingless. Under such a holding, jurisdiction could be con-
stantly subjected to change based upon the whim of any entity 
choosing to assert jurisdiction in violation of governing 
statutes, so long as the entity is allowed to continue such 
assertion over a period of time. This Court should reject such 
a holding because it displaces and overpowers the Utah Legisla-
ture's lawmaking function. Lack of statutory jurisdiction over 
one-way paging, coupled with the fact that one-way paging does 
not constitute a public utility service under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-2-1 (1986) are the most cogent reasons of all for a PSCU 
determination that it lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging. 
Therefore, because the PSCU is not departing from any prior 
determination and because cogent reasons justify PSCU action, 
Rule 8304 is valid and enforceable. 
Additionally, the PSCU should not be estopped from inter-
preting the scope of its statutory jurisdiction because (1) 
Industrial's operation of one-way paging services and expecta-
tions related thereto remain unaffected by Rule 8304; (2) 
Industrial has not suffered any injury as a result of PSCU 
cancellation of certificates; and (3) Industrial had no right 
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to rely upon its certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity as a means of either achieving or maintaining a monopoly 
status. 
Industrial claims that it has expended great sums of money 
to develop a paging service and that it would not have devel-
oped such service without authority. Industrial then cites 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 6 02 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) as authority for the proposition that the 
PSCU should be estopped from containing its regulation within 
statutory limits, and urges this Court to prevent the PSCU from 
cancelling Industrial's certificate of authority to operate 
one-way paging services. 
Industrial's reliance on the Celebrity Club decision is 
misplaced. Celebrity Club is inapplicable under the facts of 
the instant case because it involved a situation in which the 
Celebrity Club, pursuant to Commission authorization, expended 
great sums of money to complete construction of a business and 
was then completely denied authority to operate the business as 
promised. Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 689-90. In the instant 
case, Industrial has suffered no such injury. Industrial may 
make complete use of its facilities and paging operations 
without any PSCU interference. Moreover, Industrial may engage 
in operation of one-way paging services without the burden of 
regulation. Therefore, because Industrial has suffered no 
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injury as a result of Rule 8304, the doctrine of estoppel 
cannot properly be invoked. Celebrity Club, 602 P.2d at 694 
(holding that injury based on just reliance is an essential 
element of equitable estoppel). 
The only right upon which Industrial supposedly relied was 
the right to a monopoly status in the one-way paging market. 
But no such right ever existed. The record reflects that 
one-way paging was, and is, a competitive market, into which 
the PSCU could have allowed even greater access. Williams, 720 
P.2d at 774. Because one-way paging has been a competitive 
market, Industrial could have no expectation of monopoly 
status. Based on public need and desirability, even assuming 
jurisdiction over one-way paging, the PSCU could at any time 
grant additional certificates of authority. 
The fact that Industrial was required to comply with PSCU 
rules and regulations, file tariffs and pay sales tax only more 
forcefully demonstrates that the PSCU's adoption of Rule 8304 
serves to alleviate the burdens of regulation previously placed 
upon Industrial, rather than to injure Industrial's one-way 
paging system. The doctrine of equitable estoppel can not be 
invoked to protect nonexistent rights upon which Industrial 
unjustifiably relies. 
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B. PSCU Rule No. 8304 Is Valid Because One-Way Paging 
Does Not Constitute A Public Utility And Is Not 
Subject To PSCU Regulatory Jurisdiction. 
The Public Utilities Act vests authority in the PSCU to 
regulate everything which constitutes a public utility within 
the purview of the Act. Public Utility Commission v. Garvloch, 
54 Utah 406, 181 P. 272, 276 (1919). Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 
(1986) enumerates the utilities which are subject to PSCU 
jurisdiction and regulation. The relevant sections of the 
Public Utilities Act for the purposes of the instant case are 
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) which gives the commission regulatory 
jurisdiction over "telephone corporations owning, controlling, 
operating or managing any telephone line." 
A telephone corporation is defined as "every corporation 
and person . . . owning, controlling, operating, or managing 
any telephone line for public service within this state. 
. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) (1986). 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(31) (1986) defines a telephone line 
as: 
all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments 
and appliances, and all other real estate and fixtures 
and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or 
managed in connection with or to facilitate communica-
tion by telephone whether such communication is had 
with or without the use of transmission wires. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the critical factors for determining what constitutes 
a telephone corporation which makes use of a telephone line are 
(1) whether or not a corporation controls, operates or manages 
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a "telephone line;" (2) whether the corporation's activities 
constitute telephonic communications; and (3) whether one-way 
paging systems make use of a telephone line for transmissions 
"in connection with or to facilitate communication by tele-
phone. " 
Generally accepted principles of statutory construction 
provide that a statute ought to be read according to its plain 
meaning. AFLCIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
Applying the "plain meaning" principle, the PSCU excluded 
one-way paging services from the above definition of telephone 
corporation because such services do not utilize a telephone 
line. (R. at 20.) 
Two compelling reasons justify PSCU's decision. First, the 
statute calls for use of telephone equipment "in connection 
with or to facilitate communication by telephone," which 
contemplates two-way interactive communication, not just 
message transmission. Second, one-way paging does not consti-
tute two-way interactive communication achieved by using 
equipment "in connection with or to facilitate communication by 
telephone." See In Re Cincinnati Radiotelephone Systems, Inc., 
341 N.E.2d 826 (Ohio 1976). In Radiotelephone, the court held 
that where a one-way radio paging service broadcasts a radio 
signal from its own transmitter to a subscriber's pager, which 
the subscriber carries in his pocket, causing the pager to emit 
a beep which alerts the subscriber to make a telephone call, 
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such signal was not a 'telephone message* within the meaning of 
the statute, even though the radio paging service was intercon-
nected to a landline telephone facility for the sole purpose of 
transmitting signaling instructions from the telephone com-
pany's automatic answering device to the radio paging service's 
transmitter. The court further found that a company engaged in 
the business of providing such a one-way radio paging service 
to its subscribers was not a "telephone company" nor a "public 
utility" within the meaning of its public utility statute. 
The one-way paging process is accomplished by storing a 
message with a service, which either notifies the paging 
customer that the message is waiting, or sends the message 
directly to the customer. In either case, the customer cannot 
interactively communicate with the caller as with "communica-
tion by telephone." Therefore, one-way paging does not con-
stitute telephonic communication. 
In conformity with this statutory analysis, the Illinois 
Supreme Court in Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. 
Illinois Commerce Commission, 447 N.E.2d 295, 296-297 (111. 
1983), held that one-way paging systems do not come under 
Public Service Commission jurisdiction because the paging 
device cannot be used to carry on a two-way conversation and 
is, thus, not used "for or in connection with . . . the trans-
mission of telegraph or telephone messages." The same distinc-
tion was made in In Re Answerphone of Kansas City, Inc., 87 PUR 
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3d 164 (Mo. PSC 1970); and Radio Telephone Communications, Inc. 
v. Southeastern Telephone, 170 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1964). 
By analogy, the function performed by a one-way paging 
service is essentially the same as the function performed by 
other non-regulated one-way communications services, such as 
telephone answering services. Such services operate in open 
and competitive markets. The Illinois Supreme Court referred 
to the similarity between one-way paging service and telephone 
answering services, indicating the lack of authority or need 
for Commission regulation: 
The paging service is but a recipient of a telephone 
call, and the service simply notifies its subscriber 
of the call. The Commission having reconsidered and 
concluded . . . that the paging company is in reality 
only an answering service with sophisticated equip-
ment. (The only unique aspect of the service offered 
by paging businesses, the Commission argued in the 
appellate court, involves the use of radio signals, 
and the use of radio frequencies is licensed feder-
ally.) (Citation omitted.) 
Illinois Consolidated, 447 N.E.2d at 298. 
The definition of "telephone line" as contained in the Utah 
statute includes equipment and property "operated or managed in 
connection with or to facilitate communications by telephone." 
The PSCU adopted a reasonable definition of the terms "in 
connection with" and "facilitate" as used in the statute. A 
broad and unchecked definition of such terms leads to unin-
tended and absurd results. The absurdity of a broad definition 
of the term "facilitate" is noted by the Illinois Supreme Court: 
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The Commission points out that the publishers of 
telephone classified directories, such as legal or 
medical directories also facilitate telephone communi-
cation, but it could hardly be said that those pub-
lishers were intended by the legislature to be consid-
ered public utilities. Similarly it could be said 
that simple answering services aid and facilitate 
telephone communication. But it is obvious that the 
nature of the service is not a functional part of the 
transmission of message by telephone, nor is radio 
paging. (Emphasis added.) 
Illinois Consolidated, 447 N.E.2d at 298. 
The terms "in connection with" and "facilitate" as used in 
the Utah statute should be interpreted with common sense and 
applied only to that equipment and property used directly in 
the transmission of a two-way telephone communication. Other-
wise, no reasonable limit to the PSCU regulatory function in 
connection with telephone service can be attained. 
The Illinois Supreme Court is not alone in its refusal to 
assert jurisdiction over one-way paging services. In Appeal of 
Omni-Communications, Inc., 451 A.2d 1289 (N.H. 1982) the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court held that the Public Utilities Commis-
sion "PUC") had no authority to regulate the use of radio 
pagers. Reviewing the statutory, legislative and constitu-
tional history, the court concluded that in enacting the 
statutory definition of public utility the legislature did not 
intend to place all companies and businesses somehow related to 
telephones under the umbrella of PUC regulatory power. The 
court further held that by attempting to regulate radio-pagers, 
-19-
the Commission was "demonstrating the very behavior it was 
established to prevent: interference and disruption of free 
market private enterprise." Icl. at 1291. 
In Ram Broadcasting v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 
317 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. App. 1982), the Michigan court considered 
the statutory term "telephone company" in the context of the 
whole act and concluded that the legislature did not intend to 
include radio-pagers in the scope of the commission's jurisdic-
tion over public utilities. The court pointed out that the 
distinguishing factor between radio paging systems and tele-
phone companies that make use of telephone lines is that radio 
common carriers do not employ, connect, sell, lease or con-
struct lines. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of 
the circuit court, affirming the order of the commission that 
it was without power to regulate radio common carriers. 
In In Re Cincinnati Radiotelephone Systems, Inc., 341 
N.E.2d 826 (Ohio 1976), the Ohio Supreme Court reversed its 
Public Service Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over 
one-way pagers because the services were no different than 
answering services except for the replacement of a human 
operator with an answering machine. The signal transmitted by 
the paging service was not treated as a "telephonic message," 
and was therefore held not to be a public utility. 
The current trend of cases and authority strongly supports 
the jurisdictional determination that the PSCU has no statutory 
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authority to regulate one-way paging. Thus, one-way paging 
communications do not constitute the necessary telephonic 
communications, such that one-way paging should be subject to 
state regulation as a public utility under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986). See 44 A.L.R.4th 216, 220-223 
(1986). 
Aside from legalistic and precedential arguments adopted by 
the PSCU in determining its lack of jurisdiction over one-way 
paging, the PSCU adopted a basic common sense interpretation of 
its statutory jurisdiction. One-way paging service has none of 
the characteristics which requires either the need for control, 
or the public protection to justify "utility" regulation. 
One-way paging services do not require a dedication of scarce 
public resources such as public rights-of-way for pipelines, 
railroad tracks or wireline poles. Numerous paging frequencies 
are available so as to allow multiple simultaneous services in 
a competitive market. Moreover, one-way paging is not an 
essential public service which requires regulatory protection 
against destructive competition. Rather, it is a convenience 
service which is relatively easy and inexpensive to initiate. 
There is no danger that any bona fide need for such a service 
would not be accommodated in a competitive market. There is, 
therefore, no public policy or common sense justification for 
subjecting one-way paging to the rigors of utility regulation. 
Such was part of the wisdom of the PSCU in its interpretation 
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of legislative intent and statutory jurisdiction relative to 
one-way paging services. 
POINT II 
PSCU RULE NO. 8304 IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE 
AND WAS FORMULATED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL 
JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIRE-
MENTS UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT. 
A. The PSCU Properly Interpreted Its Jurisdiction Pursu-
ant To The Administrative Rulemaking Act and Did Not 
Engage In Deregulation Or Exemption Under Chapter 8b 
Of the Telecommunications Utility Act. 
In Williams v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 72 0 P.2d 
773 (Utah 1986), this Court ruled that the PSCU's interpreta-
tion of its statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging services 
must be implemented pursuant to the procedures set forth in the 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. This Court specifically 
declared that: 
"[w]e agree that the Commission failed to adhere to 
proper requirements in ruling on the jurisdictional 
issue, and accordingly reverse and remand for a new 
hearing that comports with the applicable statutes." 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 773. The only applicable statutes to 
which this Court referred were the provisions of the Admini-
strative Rulemaking Act. Id. 
The acts of the PSCU in issuing Rule No. 8304 must be 
characterized as jurisdictional interpretation by "Rulemaking" 
and not as exemption by "Deregulation." For this reason, the 
PSCU issued Rule No. 8304 pursuant to the requirements of the 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-l et 
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seg. (1985), and did not engage in deregulation proceedings 
pursuant to Chapter 8b of the Telecommunications Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-8b-l et se^. (1985). 
A critical distinction between interpretation of statutory 
jurisdiction through Rulemaking and exemption through Deregula-
tion must be made. In 1983, the relevant time period, the PSCU 
had no authority to "deregulate" any public utility because the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann § 54-8b-l et_ seg. (1985) which 
grants the PSCU power to exempt a utility service from its 
regulatory jurisdiction had not been enacted. Consequently, 
this Court's direction to the PSCU in Williams concerned 
Rulemaking, not Deregulation. Industrial's argument fails to 
distinguish between Rulemaking and Deregulation under the 
relevant statutes for at least two reasons: (1) Industrial 
erroneously states that the effect of the PSCU's Order was to 
deregulate a regulated industry by administrative fiat; and 
(2) Industrial confuses rulemaking concerning statutory juris-
diction and exemption by deregulation. 
1. The PSCU has now properly interpreted its lack -of 
jurisdiction over one-way paging through Rulemak-
ing, not by Administrative fiat. 
In 1983, for the first time, the PSCU interpreted the scope 
of its statutory jurisdiction as to one-way paging. (R. at 
235-37). The PSCU's interpretation revealed for the first time 
the fact that the Utah Legislature did not grant regulatory 
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jurisdiction over one-way paging services to the PSCU. In the 
Matter of Page America of Utah, Inc., Order on Motion for 
Exempt Certificate, Case No. 83-082-01 (November 28, 1983). 
See Addendum E. In response to Industrial's challenge against 
the validity of the PSCU's interpretation of jurisdiction over 
one-way paging, this Court simply stated that: 
the pivotal question [was] whether the decision 
announced by the Commission in the June letter 
amounted to a rule 
* * * * 
interpreting the definition of "rule" contained in 
§ 63-46-3(4), [and] in light of these considerations, 
leads us to the conclusion that the Commission was 
engaged in rulemaking and had to follow the require-
ments of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 776. The only statute that this Court 
directed the PSCU to follow was the Administrative Rulemaking 
Act: Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(3). Thus, the proper method of 
interpreting the PSCU's jurisdiction over one-way paging was 
and is through Rulemaking, not through deregulation proceedings 
which were not even in existence at the time the Williams case 
was presented to this Court. 
2. Industrial fails to distinguish between Statutory 
Interpretation and Deregulation. 
Rulemaking contemplates classification of law, jurisdiction 
and other matters. Deregulation assumes that jurisdiction to 
regulate exists and contemplates an exemption from such regula-
tory jurisdiction. It is impossible for the PSCU to exempt 
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something from regulation which is not even subject to its 
jurisdiction. The issue of whether or not the PSCU has statu-
tory jurisdiction over one-way paging has never been addressed 
by this Court until now. Thus, deregulation proceedings by the 
PSCU would be unnecessary and premature. On the other hand, 
the PSCU could, through Rulemaking, clearly interpret the scope 
of jurisdiction given it by the Utah Legislature. 
In Williams, this Court noted that in the prior case of 
Medi-Call, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 
470 P.2d 258, 260-61 (1970), it "did not reach the issue of 
whether publicly available paging service . • . would be a 
public utility . . ." In the Medi-Call case, this Court held 
that one-way paging service, operated in the private sector by 
physicians, is not a public utility service and cannot be 
regulated by PSCU. Thus, until 1983, when the PSCU determined 
that it has no jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging 
services, neither the Commission nor this Court had addressed 
the specific issue relative to jurisdiction over commercial 
one-way paging. 
Nowhere in the Williams opinion did this Court state that 
one-way paging is a public utility service under the defini-
tions then contained in the Public Utilities Act nor did this 
court indicate that it was deciding anything but the procedural 
rulemaking issue. Therefore, any other commentary is not 
binding and is properly characterized as obiter dicta. More-
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over, this Court in Williams was addressing the grievances of 
certificate holders, to the effect that proper procedure had 
not been followed to protect the interests of existing one-way 
paging service providers. In this proceeding, this Court 
focuses on the rights and duties of the PSCU and of American 
Paging, a company which has made every attempt to comply with 
the law but which now finds itself caught in the cross-fire of 
a dispute over PSCU jurisdiction. 
In Williams, this Court left the jurisdictional determina-
tion to the PSCU, to be resolved in a later rulemaking pro-
ceeding pursuant to the expertise of the PSCU. This Court 
stated: 
the jurisdictional issue [PSCU jurisdiction over 
one-way paging] likely will be resolved by a rulemak-
ing proceeding on remand and will obviate the need for 
further proceedings. . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 777. The PSCU has now complied with the 
Supreme Court's directive and has, through a proper rulemaking 
procedure, again determined that it lacks jurisdiction over 
one-way paging services. (R. at 235-242.) 
B. The PSCU Complied With This Court's Mandate In The 
Williams Decision By Following The Requirements And 
Procedures Of The Administrative Rulemaking Act, 
Obviating The Need For Further Proceedings Concerning 
Jurisdiction Over One-Way Paging. 
The PSCU complied with the requirements of the Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4 (1985) because 
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it: (1) provided adequate notice; and (2) fully complied with 
the requirements of rulemaking procedures. 
1. The PSCU Provided Adequate Notice Pursuant To 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(2) and (4) (1985). 
The notice requirements of section 63-46a-4 provide that: 
Each agency shall file its proposed rule and rule 
analysis form with the office . . . . The form and 
proposed rule . . . shall be published in the next 
issue of the bulletin. 
* * * * 
A copy of the rule analysis shall be mailed to all 
persons who have made timely requests to the agency 
for advance notice of its rulemaking proceedings, and 
to any other person who by statutory or federal 
mandate, or in the judgment of the agency, should also 
receive notice. 
In the instant case, the rule was published as required. 
(R. at 236.) In addition, Industrial received actual manual 
delivery of notice by Chairman Cameron himself. (Industrial's 
brief at 9.) Industrial acknowledges the fact that it received 
a hand delivered copy of Notice of Proposed Rule Change during 
a scheduling conference in a related proceeding. (R. at 
24-25.) By providing actual manual delivery of Notice of 
Proposed Rule Change to Industrial, the PSCU exceeded necessary 
notice requirements pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(4). 
Furthermore, Industrial has not demonstrated and the record 
does not reflect that Industrial made a "timely request to the 
PSCU for advance notice of its rulemaking." Under such circum-
stances the mailing of notice is a discretionary matter for the 
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PSCU, not an absolute right. The fact that notice was not 
mailed through the postal service does not make actual manual 
delivery ineffectual notice. Although Industrial alleges that 
it did not receive proper notice because notice was not "mailed 
to it," such technical statutory interpretive hair-splitting 
does not further the statute's objective of notice, especially 
when there is actual manual delivery of notice coupled with 
acknowledgement of receipt thereof. 
Notice is notice. Plaintiff's objection that no notice was 
given to "other interested parties" is not sustained by the 
record, nor is it required by statute. Moreover, proper notice 
was given in the Utah Bulletin, and any other notice to any 
other person is a discretionary matter which must be decided 
"in the judgment of the agency. . . . " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46a-4(4). (R. at 236.) 
2. The PSCU complied with the requirements of 
rulemaking pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46a-4(3) (1985). 
It is clear that the Notice of Proposed Rule Change pro-
vided justifications for the PSCU jurisdictional interpreta-
tion. The PSCU's summary of the rule states: 
The Public Service Commission of Utah does not have 
jurisdiction over one-way paging services. The reason 
for the rule is that one-way paging service does not 
fall within the definition of a "telephone corpora-
tion" in that such service does not utilize a "tele-
phone line." (Emphasis added.) 
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Section 63-46a-4(3)(a). The justification for the PSCU's 
jurisdictional interpretation is that because one-way paging 
does not fall within the definition of telephone corporation in 
that it does not utilize a telephone line, one-way paging does 
not fall within the definition of a public utility which is 
subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the PSCU. (R. at 
20.) Section 63-46a-4(3)(b). 
The rule analysis form for PSCU Rule No. 8304 also stated 
that the statutory authority upon which the rule was based: 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 and Supreme Court Case No. 19867. (The 
Williams decision). See Section 63-46a-4(3)(c). 
The Notice of Proposed Rule No. 8304 also contained state-
ments that: (1) there was no anticipated cost impact of the 
rule; See Section 63-46a-4(d); (2) the full text of the pro-
posed administrative rule was published in the Utah State 
Bulletin; See Section 63-46a-4(3)(e); (3) interested persons 
could present their views on the rule by requesting a hearing 
in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46a-5(1)(b) or by written comment; See Section 
63-46a-4(3)(f). Industrial failed to request a hearing pursu-
ant to § 63-46a-4(3)(g), but did file written objections to the 
proposed rule. In addition, the proposed rule included the 
name of David L. Stott and Joe Dunlop and the address and 
telephone number for contacting agency employees; See Section 
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63-46a~4(3)(h), and the signature of Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
of the PSCU; See Section 63-46a-4(3)(i). (R. at 20.) 
By providing the above-referenced materials in the rule 
analysis form, the PSCU properly fulfilled all rulemaking 
procedural requirements, and thus, created a valid and enforce-
able PSCU Rule. 
POINT III 
THE NEWLY ENACTED CHAPTER 8b OF THE TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS ACT DOES NOT ENLARGE PSCU JURIS-
DICTION TO INCLUDE ONE-WAY PAGING. 
This Court has never addressed the issue of whether or not 
the PSCU has statutory jurisdiction over commercially offered 
one-way paging services pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 et 
seq. See Argument supra at Point II.A(l). The Williams 
decision did not reach the substantive issues of PSCU jurisdic-
tion, but confined itself to the procedural issues arising out 
of the Administrative Rulemaking Act. (Petitioner's Brief at 
5, n.2.) Since the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l et 
seq. (1985) do not enlarge PSCU jurisdiction over service for 
which jurisdiction is excluded, as is the case with one-way 
paging, Section 8b is wholly inapplicable to the jurisdictional 
question at issue in the instant case. The PSCU did not 
attempt to follow the procedural requirements of Chapter 8b in 
issuing Rule 8304 because the PSCU engaged in Rulemaking, not 
deregulation. 
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Industrial's failure to distinguish between Rulemaking, 
Deregulation and the impact of Chapter 8b is best illustrated 
by Industrial's contradicting arguments: On one hand Indus-
trial maintains that the Williams decision decided only proce-
dural issues (Petitioner's brief at 5, n.2) and on the other 
hand Industrial suggests that the Williams decisions determined 
the substantive issue regarding PSCU jurisdiction over one-way 
paging. (Petitioner's Brief at 21.) Industrial's misunder-
standing is clarified by an analysis of the Telecommunications 
Act. Utah Code Ann., § 54-8b-l et se^. (1985). 
The PSCU has officially determined that the recent legisla-
tion resulting in Chapter 54-8b which relates to its increased 
powers to deregulate telephone services does not expand its 
jurisdiction to include the regulation of one-way paging 
services. (R. at 270-71.) 
The Telecommunications Utility Act states that it is for 
the purpose of "providing a method of exempting certain 
services from regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(l) states 
that the PSCU is "vested with power to partially or wholly 
exempt from any requirement of this title any 
telecommunications corpora- tion or public telecommunications 
service in this state." In Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(2), the 
legislature provided a mechan- ism which the PSCU may use to 
exempt such services from regula- tion. In Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-8b-9 (1985), the Utah Legislature 
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clarified its position concerning the PSCU's jurisdiction over 
public utilities by stating that: 
Nothing in the chapter shall be construed to enlarge 
or reduce the Commission jurisdiction over the ser-
vices and entities for which jurisdiction is provided 
or excluded by other provisions of this title. 
When construed together, these combined sections indicate a 
legislative purpose to reduce regulatory authority over tele-
communications services, without disturbing PSCU jurisdiction 
previously defined by statute. 
Departure from the literal language and meaning of a 
statute is not justified when such a construction produces an 
absurd or unjust result, inconsistent with the purposes and 
policies of the act in question. 2A Sutherland Stat. Const, at 
Section 45.12. See Brief of the Division of Public Utilities. 
(R. at 177-200.) Departure from the literal language of the 
Public Utilities Act creates a forced interpretation which has 
been rejected by the PSCU because it produces results that are 
inconsistent with the avowed purposes of the Telecommunications 
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-l(3). Additionally, the broad 
definitions contained in Chapter 8b cannot enlarge or reduce 
previous PSCU jurisdiction. 
First, as noted above, such a broad and all-encompassing 
interpretation of the Act results in a contradictory reading of 
the statute taken as a whole. A broad interpretation of the 
Act would result in the unintended regulation of previously 
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unregulated transmissions such as one-way radio and television 
broadcasts, in addition to two-way broadcasts, such as talk 
shows, all in direct violation of the Section 54-8b-9 limita-
tion. 
Second, by analogy, the PSCU acknowledged this argument in 
its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30), noting that 
if one focuses on the phrase "facilitate telephone communica-
tion," the scope of potentially regulated services becomes 
staggering. Regulation under such an interpretation would 
include all suppliers of telephone equipment, wiring com-
ponents, telephone directories, all answering services, radio 
talk stations, etc. Because such interpretations produce 
unintended results, the PSCU adopted the more reasonable 
interpretation, finding that the statutory emphasis was on 
interactive two-way communication. 
Third, the explicit purpose of Chapter 54-8b is to deregu-
late telecommunications services over which the PSCU now has 
statutory jurisdiction and which exist in a competitive 
environment. In contrast, the rationale for regulation of 
public utilities is the need to control monopoly power, which 
usually arises as a consequence of economies of scale in 
production or limits on entry into a particular business. 
Neither of these conditions, which could lead to monopoly 
power, are present in the one-way paging industry. 
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Therefore, the PSCU is entitled to a presumption that it is 
correct in its interpretation of its jurisdictional power and 
the effect of the Chapter 8b legislation. Colman, 403 P.2d at 
784. 
POINT IV 
PSCU RULE NO. 8304 REGARDING LACK OF JURIS-
DICTION OVER ONE-WAY PAGING DOES NOT IMPACT 
CERTIFICATE HOLDERS' CONSTITUTIONAL DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The fifth amendment states in pertinent part: "nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. Const. Amend. V. This protection is applicable 
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. The Utah due 
process provision provides that "no person shall be deprived of 
life liberty or property, without due process of law. Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7. 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the United States Supreme Court stated 
that no "set formula" exists to determine whether a taking 
results in a denial of due process. Consequently, the Court 
must engage in "essentially ad hoc factual inquiries" to make 
such a determination. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
In almost all cases, a determination of whether or not a 
taking has occurred concerns: (1) a permanent physical inva-
sion or occupation of real property by government; (2) a 
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temporary physical invasion by government; or (3) government 
regulation constituting either regulation of use of property or 
a denial of a right to use property. Traditional taking 
analyses with respect to certificates of authority involve 
protests against restricting authority, not protests against 
jurisdictional interpretations resulting in complete non-
regulation, and creation of free market conditions. 
However, in the case of regulation or non-regulation, the 
United States Supreme Court has stated the standard for deter-
mining whether a taking has occurred. In Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (cita-
tion omitted), the Court stated: 
[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the 
interference . . . can be characterized as a physical 
invasion by government, than when [the] interference 
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits 
and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good." _I_d. (citation omitted). 
Likewise, in Penn Central, the Supreme Court identified the two 
most significant factors with which to determine if a govern-
ment action is unduly oppressive: (1) the economic impact of 
the regulation (or non-regulation in this case) on the property 
holder; and (2) the character of the government action. _I_d. at 
124-136. 
In the instant case, there is a complete withdrawal by the 
PSCU from regulation of one-way paging, and thus, absolutely no 
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interference by the State with Industrial's or any other paging 
company's one-way paging service. The non-regulation of 
one-way paging is supported by the Federal Communications 
Commission's ("FCC") deregulation of radio frequencies for use 
in paging services.2 Thus, non-regulation by the PSCU due to 
a lack of jurisdiction over one-way paging is best character-
ized as an effort to aid the FCC in its effort to adjust the 
benefits and burdens upon communications networks, to increase 
and promote the common good of United States citizens. 
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426. 
Under the first Penn Central factor, there is no signifi-
cant economic impact upon Industrial or any other certificate 
holder because certificate holders still have their freedom to 
operate one-way paging services. Moreover, certificate holders 
never had any assurance of a noncompetitive one-way paging 
market, even when mistakenly regulated by the PSCU. The PSCU 
had already created a competitive market for Industrial by 
See 47 C.F.R. 22.501(a)(1) and (4), (d), and (p)(l) 
(1983). The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has 
now issued an Order in In the Matter of State Entry Regula-
tion in the Public Land Mobile Service, C.C. Docket 
No, 85-89, RM-811 (May 17, 1985), preempting state entry 
laws and regulations which have the effect of prohibiting 
or impeding the entry of FCC licensed mobile radio carries 
into state markets. The FCC Order is currently pending 
court review. 
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issuing a certificate to Mobile Telephone and it could have 
granted more one-way paging certificates as it determined to be 
in the public interest. Thus, Industrial had no expectation of 
a non-competitive market. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo 
that relief from the burden of regulation does have a negative 
impact on the value of Industrial's paging service, such a 
circumstance is not conclusive as to a government taking. For 
example, in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme Court upheld a regulation reducing 
the owner's property value by 75%. And in Hadacheck v. 
Sabastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the Supreme Court upheld a 
regulation reducing the plaintiff's property value by 87-1/2%. 
Consequently, without more, a reduction of value of a paging 
service through non-regulation and cancellation of certificates 
is not enough to invalidate PSCU jurisdictional Rule No. 8304 
on constitutional grounds. 
The courts have determined that the second Penn Central 
factor, the character of the governmental intrusion, is akin to 
a continuum where the closer the property interference is to a 
physical intrusion, the more likely the interference will be 
considered an unreasonable exercise of the police power. A 
Utah Federal District Court decision reasoned that a taking 
must deprive the owner of all reasonable use of property or 
there is no violation of due process under Utah law. Katsos v. 
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Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D. Utah 1986) 
(applying Utah law). 
In the instant case, Industrial has not been deprived of 
any use of property, and more importantly, any and all govern-
ment interference has been removed. The PSCU Rule at issue 
clearly allows Industrial to use its paging service as it would 
have used it absent the PSCU Rule. Hence, "the law does not 
interfere with what must be regarded as [Industrial's] . . . 
primary expectation of the property. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 
136. Industrial's primary expectation of its property interest 
in the PSCU Certificate is and was the operation of a paging 
service. This property interest remains undisturbed by PSCU 
Rule No. 8304. Industrial has no claim of due process viola-
tions or estoppel because there is no taking and no detrimental 
reliance under the facts of this case. Therefore, under this 
Court's traditional analysis and that of the United States 
Supreme Court (i.e., considering the economic impact, presence 
of public interests and lack of governmental intrusion), 
non-regulation of one-way paging due to lack of jurisdiction is 
constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, American Paging respect-
fully requests this Court to uphold the validity and enforce-
ability of PSCU Rule No. 8304 and the PSCU's Order granting 
-38-
American Paging's Motion to Dismiss Its Application for Certi-
ficate of Convenience and Necessity. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Hi ~ day of October, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
SCM3026A 
By ^ ^ / f ^ ^ ^ 
L a r r y R. Llaycock 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. , § 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986|) 
Public Utilities Definitions: 
When used in this title: 
k k k k 
(30) "Telephone corporation11 (includes every 
corporation and person, their les!sees, trustees, 
and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, 
or managing any telephone line fojr public ser-
vice within this state, provided, however, that 
all corporations, partnerships, or firms pro-
cellular telephone service 
"telephone corporations" nine 
the wire-line and the nonwire-
viding intrastate 
shall cease to be 
months after both 
line cellular service providers have been issued 
covering licenses by 
Commission. It does 
which provides, on a 
or telecommunication 
the Federal 
not include 
resale basis 
service whic! 
from a telephone corporation, 
Communications 
any person 
, any telephone 
h is purchased 
(31) "Telephone line" included all conduits, 
ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and 
applicances, and all other real estate, fixtures, 
and personal property owned, controlled, oper-
ated, or managed in connection wijth or to facili-
tate communication by telephone vJhether that com-
munication is had with or withoutl 
transmission wires. 
the use of 
ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Ann., § 63-46a-4(2), (3) and (4) (1985). 
Administrative Rulemaking Procedure: 
* * * "k 
(2) Each agency shall file it^ proposed 
rule and rule analysis form with the office. 
Rule amendments shall be marked, with new 
language underlined and deleted language in-
terlined. The form and proposed rule, unless 
the rule is too long as determined by the 
office, shall be published in th£ next issue 
of the bulletin. 
(3) The rule analysis form shall contain: 
(a) a summary of the rul^ or change; 
(b) the purpose of the riile or rea-
son for the change; 
(c) the statutory authority or fed-
eral requirement for the rule; 
(d) the anticipated cost or savings 
to the state budget and compliance cost 
for affected persons; 
(e) how interested persons may in-
spect the full text of the rul^; 
(f) how interested persons may pre-
sent their views on the rule; 
(g) the time and place of any 
scheduled public hearing; 
(h) the name and telephone number 
of an agency employee who may be con-
tacted about the rule; and 
(i) the signature of the agency 
head or designee. 
B-l 
(4) A copy of the rule analysis form shall be 
mailed to all persons who have made timely re-
quest of the agency for advance notice of its 
rulemaking proceedings, and to any other person 
who, by statutory or federal mandate, or in the 
judgment of the agency, should also receive 
notice. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Utah Code Ann., § 54-8b-l et seq. (1985). 
PSC JURISDICTION OVER TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATIONS 
1985 
GENERAL SESSION 
Enrolled Copy 
S. B. No. 102 By Lyle W. Hillyard 
Glade M. Sowards 
Omar B. Bunnell 
AN ACT RELATING TO THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION; CLARIFYING 
THE AUTHORITY OF THE PSC TO REGULATE INTRASTATE PUBLIC 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES; AND PROVIDING A METHOD OF 
EXEMPTING CERTAIN SERVICES FROM REGULATION. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS 
FOLLOWS: 
ENACTS: 
CHAPTER 8b, TITLE 54, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 19p3 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state Of Utah: 
Section 1. Chapter 8b, Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is enacted to read: 
54-8b-l. This chapter is known as the "Public 
Telecommunications Utility Lav." 
54-8b-2. As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commission" means the Public Service| Commission. 
(2) "Intrastate telecommunications service" means any 
telecommunj cations service in which the informjation transmitted 
originates and terminates within the boundariejs of this state. 
(3) "Public telecommunications services" means the 
transmission of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, 
messages, data, or other information of anjy nature by wire, 
radio, lightwaves, or other electromagnetic mjeans offered to 
the public generally. 
(4) "Telecommunications corporation"
 | means every 
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, receivers, or 
S. B. No. 102 
trustees appointed by any court, owning, controlling, 
operating, managing, or reselling a public telecommunications 
service. 
54-8b-3. (1) The commission is vested with power and 
jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt from any requirement 
of this title any telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service in this state. 
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or in response 
to an application by a telecommunications corporation or a user 
of a public telecommunications service, may, after public 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, make findings and 
issue an order specifying its requirements, terms, and 
conditions exempting any telecommunications corporation or any 
public telecommunications service from any requirement of this 
title either for a specific geographic area or in the entire 
state if the commission finds that the telecommunications 
corporation or service is subject to effective competition, 
that customers of the telecommunications corporation or service 
have reasonably available alternatives, and that the 
telecommunications corporation or service does not serve a 
captive customer base, and if such exemption is in the public 
interest of the citizens of the state. In determining whether 
to exempt any telecommunications corporation or public 
telecommunications service from any requirement of this title, 
the commission shall consider all relevant factors including, 
but not limited to; (a) the number of other providers offering 
similar services; (b) the intrastate market power and market 
share within the state of Utah of the telecommunications 
corporation requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate market 
power and market share of other providers; (d) the existence of 
C -2-
S. B. No. 102 
other providers to make functionally equivalent services 
readily available at competitive rates, terms, land conditions; 
(e) the effect of exemption on the regulated revenue 
requirements of the telecommunications corporation requesting 
an exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other providers into the 
marketplace; (g) the overall impact of exemption on the public 
interest; (h) the integrity of all service providers in the 
proposed market; (i) the cost of providing quch service; (j) 
the economic impact on existing telecommunications 
corporations; and (k) whether competition will promote the 
provision of adequate services at just and reasonable rates. 
(3) The commission shall approve or deny ,any application 
for exemption under this section within 240 4ays, except that 
the commission may by order defer action forf an additional 
30-day period. If the commission has no^ acted on any 
application within the permitted time period, the application 
shall be deemed granted. 
54-8b-4. (1) The commission may enter an order partially 
or wholly exempting any public telecommunications service from 
any requirement of this title as to rates, tariffs, or fares 
and may authorize the provision of all or!any portion of a 
public telecommunications service under statecji or negotiated 
terms to any person that is committed to the acquisition of, 
through construction, lease, or any other font^of acquisition, 
comparable telecommunications services from; an alternative 
source of supply. 
(2) Telecommunications corporations may negotiate with the 
person or entity for the provision of public telecommunications 
services without regard to the provisions of any tariffs *on 
file and approved by the commission, but any rate, toll, fare, 
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rental, charge, or classification of service in such contracts 
shall be fully compensatory. 
(3) Within ten days after the conclusion of the 
negotiations and prior to the execution of any contract, the 
telecommunications corporation shall file with the commission 
the proposed final agreements and other evidence of the public 
telecommunications services to be provided together with the 
charges and other conditions of the service. The commission 
may approve or deny an application for approval of a 
competitive contract within 30 days of the filing of the 
application by the telecommunications corporation or the final 
contract shall become effective. The commission, in 
consideration of approval of the competitive contract, shall 
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, 
whether the contract for any rate, toll, fare, rental, charge, 
or classification of service covers the cost of providing such 
service, provides for adequate service at just and reasonable 
rates, and does not have significant adverse effects upon the 
integrity of other telecommunications corporations. After a 
competitive contract has become effective the commission, in 
the next general rate case for that telecommunications 
corporation, shall review the contract, consistent with the 
factors stated in this subsection, and shall make any 
adjustment in its rate order, including, but not limited to 
retroactive adjustment, deemed necessary by the commission to 
avoid cross subsidization from other regulated intrastate 
telecommunications services. Any costs incurred in fulfilling 
the terms of a competitive contract may not be recovered from 
the regulated rate base. 
C-4-
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(4) Any telecommunications corporation that provides 
public telecommunications services under a competitive contract 
may not offer the services under contract ifl a manner that 
unfairly discriminates between customers. 
54-8b-5. The telecommunications corporation making 
application for approval of a contract shall publish notice of 
that application under rules enacted by the commission. The 
commission, at its discretion or in response to a protested 
application, may hold a hearing as provided in Sections 54-7-10 
and 54-7-12, and the 30-day time limit of Section 54-8b-3 does 
not apply. 
54-8b-6. A telecommunications corporation providing 
intrastate public telecommunications services may not subsidize 
from those services subject to regulation under this chapter 
services which are not regulated. 
54-8b-7. The commission shall retain continuous 
jurisdiction over every telecommunications corporation or 
public telecommunications service exempted uncler this chapter 
and may exercise any statutory grant ofl power pertaining 
thereto, including the power to revoke or modify any order 
approving an exemption from regulation. The commission, may, 
after notice and hearing, revoke or modify an order approving 
exemption, if after considering the factprs in Subsection 
54-8b-3 (2), the commission finds such modification or 
revocation to be in the public interest. 
54-8b-8. Nothing in this chapter shall in any way 
preempt, modify, exempt, abrogate, or otherwise affect any 
right, cause of action, liability, duty, or bbligation arising 
from any federal, state, or local law governing unfair business 
practices or antitrust, restraint of trade, or other 
anti-competitive activity. 
C-5-
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54-8b-9. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed tc 
enlarge or reduce the commission's jurisdiction over the 
services and entities for which jurisdiction is provided or 
excluded by other provisions of this title. 
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ADDENDUM D 
WILLIAMS v. PUBLIC SI 
Cite as 720 P^d 
David R. WILLIAMS, dba Industrial 
Communications, Petitioner, 
v. 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man; David R. Irvine, Commissioner, 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a 
corporation, Petitioner, 
v. 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man, David R. Irvine, Commissioner, 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
Nos. 19867, 19873. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 4, 1986. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Public Service Commission holding that 
Commission had no authority to regulate 
one-way mobile telephone paging services. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act so that Commis-
sion was required to follow Act's procedur-
al requirements. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Telecommunications <3=>461 
Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act [U.C.A.1953, 63-
46-3(4) (Repealed)], so that Commission 
was required to follow Act's procedural 
flVICE COMTS OF UTAH Utah 7 7 3 
73 (Utah 1986) 
requirements. U.C.A.1953, 54-1-1 et seq., 
54-1-1.6, 54-7-1.5, 54-7-13, 63-46a-l et 
seq, 63-46a-2(8), 63-46a-3(3)(a), 63-46a-4; 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46-1, 63-46-3(4), 63-46-5 
(Repealed); Const Art 1, § 7; U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Telecommunications e=>461 
Commissioners on Public Service Com-
mission who had participated in decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
was required to operate one-way mobile 
telephone paging service, announced in let-
ter to prospective pperator, would not be 
precluded from considering the jurisdiction-
al matter on remand on basis that they had 
violated statutory prohibitions against ex 
parte communications, where prospective 
operator was not party to any proceeding 
pending before Coinmission at time letter 
was issued. U.C.Ah1953, 54-7-1.5. 
Keith E. Taylor, F. Robert Reeder, Mi-
chael L. Larsen, Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
David L. Stott, Stuart L Poelman, Salt 
Lake City, for int^rvenor Amer. Paging. 
Stephen R. Randle, Salt Lake City, for 
Page Amer. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig 
Rich, Asst Atty. Qen., Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Petitioners Industrial Communications 
and Mobile Telephone, Inc., appeal from an 
order of the Utah Public Service Commis-
sion ("Commission") holding that the Com-
mission has no authority to regulate one-
way mobile telephone paging services. Pe-
titioners allege, inter alia, that the Com-
mission did not fopow proper administra-
tive procedures in Concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction. We agree that the Commis-
sion failed to adliere to proper require-
ments in ruling on, the jurisdictional issue, 
and accordingly reverse and remand for a 
D - l 
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new hearing that comports with the appli-
cable statutes. 
Understanding the history of the Com-
mission's assertion of regulatory authority 
over one-way paging services is important 
to this case. In 1962, the Commission 
granted a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to operate both a two-way 
mobile telephone system and a one-way 
paging service to petitioner Mobile Tele-
phone, Inc. By this action, and without 
objection from any party, the Commission 
assumed jurisdiction over both one-way 
paging and two-way mobile telephone ser-
vices under sections 54-2-1(21), (22), and 
(30) of the Code.1 Between 1962 and 1983 
the Commission granted similar dual au-
thority certificates to three other compa-
nies. In 1974, the Commission granted to 
Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a 
single authority certificate covering only 
one-way paging service. From the record, 
it appears that the Commission has, on 
occasion, denied requests for certificates 
for one-way paging authority. Until 1983, 
however, the Commission's authority to 
regulate one-way paging services was not 
questioned. 
In the early 1980's, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission deregulated radio 
frequencies for use in paging services. 
Sixty-nine channels were made available in 
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-2-1(30) (Repl. Vol 6A, 
1974), states in part 'The term 'public utility' 
includes every telephone corporation 
where the service is performed for, or the com-
modity delivered to the public generally 
Subsection (22) states. 
The term "telephone corporation" includes ev-
ery corporation and person, their lessees, 
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed 
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling, 
operating or managing any telephone line for 
public service within this state 
Subsection (21) states 
The term "telephone line" includes all con-
duits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments 
and appliances, and all other real estate and 
fixtures and personal property owned, con-
trolled, operated or managed in connection 
with or to facilitate communication by tele-
phone whether such communication is had 
with or without the use of transmission wires. 
2. See 47 C.FR. 22 501(a)(1) and (4), (d) and 
<p)(l) (1983) 
Utah on a first-come, first-served basis.2 
Page America, Inc., American Paging, Inc., 
and United Paging Corporation each re-
ceived a permit from the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to operate on one of 
the new frequencies early in 1983.3 In 
May of 1983, American Pagmg's attorney 
contacted Commissioner Irvine to inquire 
whether American Paging could operate a 
one-way paging system without a certifi-
cate. At the request of this attorney, Com-
missioner Irvine discussed the issue with 
the other commissioners. Thereafter, the 
Commission sent a letter to the attorney 
for American Paging, dated June 3, 1983, 
stating that in the Commission's opinion, no 
certificate was required. It added that the 
Commission would not request a hearing 
on the issue4 That letter is the basis of 
the controversy here. 
In August of 1983, Page America applied 
for a certificate to operate a paging ser-
vice; petitioner Industrial Communications 
protested the application. The Commission 
scheduled a public hearing on the applica-
tion for December of 1983, indicating its 
desire to "review" its jurisdiction over one-
way paging services. Page America later 
moved for a determination that it was ex-
empt from regulation. The Commission 
scheduled a hearing on that motion for 
November 7th. 
3. After receiving its permit from the FCC, Unit-
ed Paging Corporation applied to the Commis-
sion for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity, which application was pending at the time 
of the Commission's hearing now under review 
United Paging did not take part in that hearing 
and its present status is not apparent from the 
record. 
4. The letter read in pertinent part-
Inasmuch as American Paging of Utah is pro-
posing to offer only one way paging service, 
rather than telephone service as defined in the 
Utah Code, it does not appear necessary for 
your client to file an application for a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity As 
a matter of policy the Commission does not 
construe its jurisdiction on an informal basis, 
but deems the statute sufficiently clear on its 
fact that it would not, on its own motion, 
require a hearing with respect to your pro-
posed operation. 
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Meanwhile, American Paging had begun 
operations without a certificate in reliance 
'on the Commission's June letter declining 
to exercise jurisdiction. Industrial Commu-
nications therefore asked the Commission 
to issue a cease and desist order to stop 
American Paging from operating without a 
certificate. A hearing on the cease and 
desist request was held October 24, 1983. 
At that hearing, the Commission admitted 
it was in a dilemma inasmuch as it had 
"contradicted itself somewhat by the is-
suance of the June 3rd, 1983 letter." The 
Commission refused to order American 
Paging to stop operations; however, it or-
dered American Paging not to accept new 
customers until after the November hear-
ing on Page America's certificate at which 
the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed. 
Following the November hearing, the 
Commission formally ruled that it had no 
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging ser-
vices, effectively deregulating that field. 
The Commission dismissed Page America's 
application for a certificate and cancelled 
the certificates of Industrial Communica-
tions and Mobile Telephone, Inc., to the 
extent they authorized one-way paging ser-
vices. It also cancelled the certificate 
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern 
Utah, Inc., authorizing the operation of a 
oneway paging system.5 
After the ruling, Industrial Communica-
tions, which had opposed deregulation, 
sought a reversal of the Commission's or-
der and a disclosure of ex parte communi-
cations relating to the jurisdictional issue. 
It also moved for a rehearing before a 
commission pro tempore, claiming that by 
virtue of the June letter to American Pag-
ing, the Commission had prejudged the jur-
5. Two companies not participating in the hear-
ing still hold certificates of convenience and 
necessity for one-way paging services. 
6. Section 54-1-1.6 of the Code, enacted in 1983 
(1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 5), provides for a 
commissioner pro tempore to be appointed by 
the governor when a commissioner is "tempo-
rarily dismissed or disqualified." Commission-
ers pro tern shall have the qualifications re-
quired for public service commissioners, 
7. The Utah Rule Making Act was repealed and 
replaced in its entirety after the facts giving rise 
isdictional issues.* The Commission ac-
knowledged the Jujie letter and the con-
tacts leading up to it, but refused to set 
aside its order for any reason. On appeal, 
Industrial Communications and Mobile 
Telephone, Inc., challenge the Commis-
sion's actions. 
The principal procedural point raised by 
petitioners is that the Commission's June 
letter effectively operated to relinquish the 
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way 
paging, and stripped petitioners and their 
similarly situated competitors of a valuable 
property right—theirf certificates. Petition-
ers argue that under the provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, the 
hearing provisions pi the Public Service 
Commission Act, and the due process claus-
es of state and federal constitutions, the 
June letter constituted a de facto rule mak-
ing which required tfcat all interested par-
ties be given proper Notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. Sbe U.C.A., 1953, § 63-
46-5 (2nd RepL VoL 7A, 1978); U.C.A., 
1953, § 54-7-13 (RepL Vol. 6A, 1974); Utah 
Const a r t I, § 7; aid U.S. Const amend. 
XIV. 
[1] We first inquire whether the Com-
mission's actions complied with the proce-
dural requirements of the statutes govern-
ing agency rule making or agency adjudica-
tion. Any state agency promulgating a 
rule must follow the procedures specified 
in that act U.C.A., 11953, § 63-46-1 (2nd 
RepL Vol. 7A, 1978).^  A rule is defined as 
a "statement of general applicability . . . 
that implements or interprets the law or 
prescribes the policy of the agency in the 
administration of its functions " 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-3(4) (2nd RepL Vol. 
to this action occurred. Our conclusion would 
not be any different ivere we to analyze this 
case under the new statute. 1985 Utah Laws ch. 
158, § 2. The statute i|ow requires rule making 
whenever "agency actions affect a class of per-
sons" and defines a rule as "a statement made 
by an agency that applies to a general class of 
persons . . . [whichl implements or interprets 
policy made by statute " U.C.A-, 1953, 
§ 63-46a-3(3Xa). -2(8)|(2nd RepL VoL^A, 1978 
and Supp.1985). 
D - 3 
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7A, 1978). The Public Utilities Act, also 
relied on by petitioners, requires that the 
Commission give notice and hold a hearing 
before it alters, amends, or rescinds an 
order or decision. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-7-13 
(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). Petitioners claim 
that the procedural requirements of at 
least one of these statutes apply here be-
cause the June letter constituted either a 
"rule" within the meaning of the Rule Mak-
ing Act, or an "order" within the meaning 
of the Public Utilities Act. 
The Commission argues that the June, 
1983, letter was not a rule making within 
the meaning of the Utah Rule Making Act 
because it did not have general applicabili-
ty. The Commission also argues that be-
cause it had never formally determined 
that it had jurisdiction to regulate paging 
services under the Public Utilities Act, it 
was free to announce its opinion on the 
subject without any procedural formalities. 
There is no merit to the Commission's ar-
guments. 
As an initial matter, we note that the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act 
seems most directly on point here. It deals 
in some specificity with matters that the 
Public Utilities Act covers only inferential-
ly, and the Rule Making Act's provisions do 
not appear inconsistent with the earlier en-
acted utility statute. 
The pivotal question is whether the deci-
sion announced by the Commission in the 
June letter amounted to a rule. It might 
be argued that the Commission's action 
here is merely legitimate law development 
through adjudication as opposed to rule 
making. We acknowledge that there is a 
variance of opinion on when an agency is 
engaged in rule making and must follow 
formal rule making procedures, and when 
an agency may legitimately proceed by 
way of adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct. 
1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969); and NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct 
1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). However, we 
think that there are some fundamental 
8. For these reasons, section 54-7-1.5, governing 
the functions of the Commission when entering 
points of reference in this area of the law 
that are of assistance in determining 
whether the Commission should have prr> 
ceeded by formal rule making. Professor 
Davis summarized some of these considera-
tions. 
Although a retroactive clarification of 
uncertain law may be brought about 
through adjudication, according to [SEC 
v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S. 194 [67 S.Ct. 
1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) ] and its many 
progency . . . , the problem may be differ-
ent when an agency through adjudication 
makes a change in clear law, as when it 
overrules a batch of its own decisions, 
especially if private parties have acted in 
reliance on the overruled decisions. 
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§ 7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978). Interpreting 
the definition of "rule" contained in section 
63-46-3(4), in light of these considerations, 
leads us to the conclusion that the Commis-
sion was engaged in rule making and had 
to follow the requirements of the Utah 
. Administrative Rule Making Act.8 
First, the Commission's decision was 
generally applicable: by deregulating the 
one-way paging market and permitting 
open competition in the market, the deci-
sion altered the rights of all certificate 
holders, despite their explicit reliance on 
the Commission's prior interpretation. Sec-
ond, the letter interpreted the scope of the 
Commission's statutory regulatory powers, 
thus "interpreting] the law," within the 
meaning of the Rule Making Act. More 
over, in so acting the Commission, in the 
words of Professor Davis, made a "change 
in clear law." For over twenty years, the 
Commission has interpreted its authority 
over telephone corporations to include one-
way paging services. It has required cer-
tificate holders to file tariffs and pay public 
utility sales taxes. It has denied some 
requests for certificates. In one case, it 
issued a certificate that covered only one-
way paging. In Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 
P.2d 258 (1970), the Commission even went 
an order, has no application to the June letter 
or the proceedings leading up to its issuance. 
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to court to defend its' jurisdiction over pag-
ing services.9 
Under all these circumstances, we con-
clude that the Commission cannot reverse 
its long-settled position regarding the scope 
of its jurisdiction and announce a funda-
mental policy change without following the 
requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Rule Making Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor 
Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1981), 
cert denied, 459 U.S. 999, 103 S.Ct. 358, 74 
L.Ed.2d 394 (1982); see also 2 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7:25, at 
125 (2d ed.1978). These requirements were 
not met. Nonparties were not given notice 
of the Commission's intention to reconsider 
its long-held position in connection with the 
June letter. And the November adjudica-
tive hearing certainly cannot be considered 
an adequate substitute for a rule making 
proceeding. Many of the protections pro-
vided for by the Act were missing from 
that proceeding, including adequate ad-
vance notices to all affected parties, an 
opportunity to participate, and an opportu-
nity to comment on the proposed rule. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46a-4 (2d Repl. Vol. 7A, 
1978, Supp.1985). Because the require-
ments of the Act were not satisfied, the 
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
[2] The next issue is whether the cur-
rent commissioners should be precluded 
from considering the jurisdictional matter 
on remand. Petitioners contend that the 
commissioners who participated in the deci-
sion announced in the June letter had pre-
judged the jurisdictional issue. Therefore, 
they request that we order the recusal of 
all the commissioners and the appointment 
of a commission pro tempore. 
Petitioners assert that recusal is neces-
sary because the opinion announced in the 
June letter violated the statutory prohibi-
tions against ex parte communication 
about matters pending before the Commis-
sion. Section 54-7-1.5 provides in part: 
9. This Court ruled in Medic-Call that the PSC 
could have no jurisdiction over a private non-
profit paging service because it was not a public 
utility. We did not reach the issue of whether a 
No member of the public service commis-
sion . . . shall make or knowingly cause 
to be made to any party any communica-
tion relevant to the merits of any matter 
under adjudication unless notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are afforded to 
all parties. No party shall make or 
knowingly cause to be made to any mem-
ber of the commission . . . an ex parte 
communication relevant to the merits of 
any matter under adjudication. 
There are several problems with petition-
ers' argument. By its terms the statute 
does not apply to dealings between the 
Commission and American Paging. In 
May and June of 1983, American Paging 
was not a party to any proceeding pending 
before the Commission that involved the 
question of the Commission's jurisdiction 
over one-way paging services. Moreover, 
the letter was not an adjudication but, in 
substance, a rule making, as we have noted 
above. Therefore, any dealings between 
American Paging and the commissioners 
could not be a communication between a 
"party" and a member of the Commission 
"relevant to the merits" of "any matter 
under adjudication." Second, section 54-7-
1.5 was not effective until July 1, 1983, 
almost a month after the letter was writ-
ten. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 15. 
It is true that the later proceedings be-
fore the Commission on the application of 
Page America for a certificate should be 
classified as an "adjudication" within the 
meaning of section 54-7-1.5, and that these 
proceedings occurred after the effective 
date of the statute. However, that does 
not change the.nature of the May and June 
communications between the Commission 
and American Paging nor the fact that the 
statute, by its terms, does not apply to 
them. 
Because the jurisdictional issue likely 
will be resolved by a rule making proceed-
ing on remand and will obviate the need for 
further proceedings, we need not further 
publicly available paging service, such as peti-
tioners here operate, would be a public utility 
because our holding was limited to the private 
nature of the arrangements before us. 
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consider whether and under what circum-
stances recusal may be required in adminis-
trative adjudications when the specific pro-
visions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply. 
Plainly, having participated in a rule mak-
ing proceeding does not automatically pre-
clude a commissioner from participating in 
a later, properly conducted adjudication. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised and find their disposition unneces-
sary to the result. The Commission's rule 
is of no force and effect, and its order is 
vacated. The matter is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver 
License Services, Utah Department of 
Public Safety, Defendant and Respon-
dent 
No. 20112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1986. 
Utah State Driver License Division re-
voked driving privileges of driver for peri-
od of one year. The Seventh District 
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. David-
son, J., affirmed the administrative deci-
sion. Driver appealed. The Supreme 
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for 
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs was intended by legislature 
to protect public safety and apprehend 
drunken driver before he or she strikes and 
may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble, and (2) driv-
er's refusal to submit to breath test upon 
rumors that there had been incidents of 
tampering with breathalyzer in the past 
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting de-
fendant to license revocation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles 0=144.2(9) 
In revocation proceeding, Driver Divi-
sion has burden to show that operator of 
vehicle was in actual physical control of 
motor vehicle and that arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that operator was 
under influence of alcohol. 
2. Automobiles <3=>144.2(10) 
In trial de novo, district court must 
determine by preponderance of evidence 
whether driver's license was subject to rev-
ocation for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10. 
3. Automobiles <s=»144.2(3) 
Supreme Court's review of district 
court's determination as to whether driv-
er's license was subject to revocation for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol 
is deferential to trial court's view of evi-
dence unless trial court has misapplied 
principles of law or its findings are clearly 
against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles <3=>144.1(1) 
Even if truck was inoperable at time 
that licensee was found sleeping in it and 
arrested, that would not preclude him from 
having "actual physical control" over truck 
so that his driver's license could be revoked 
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alco-
hol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2). 
5. Automobiles <3=>349 
Statute providing for arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
was intended by legislature to protect pub-
lic safety and apprehend drunken driver 
before he or she strikes and may not be 
construed to exclude those vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanical 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter cf the Applica-
tion Of PAGE AMERICA OF UTAH, 
INC. for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity as a 
Common Carrier for Furnishing 
Paging Service to Areas Within 
Salt Lake, Davis, Utah, and 
Tooele Counties, Utan. 
CASE 
ORE1 
FOR EX 
NO. 83-082-
ER ON MOTION 
CZRTIF: 
01 
GATE 
Appearances: 
Stephen R. Rancle 
Stuart L. Poelman 
Erintcn R. Burbidge 
X. M. Lewis 
Richard Hinckley, 
Assistant Attcrr.e; 
General 
For Applicant 
" American Pacing cf Utah, 
Inc., amicus curiae 
David R. Williams, dba 
Industrial 
Communications, 
Protestant 
" Mobile Telephone, Inc., 
Protestant 
n
 Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State cf Utah 
By the Commission: 
Applicant filed its application in this matter August 10, 
1983. Subsequent thereto, the question arcse whether the Commis-
sion had jurisdiction to entertain said application, and the 
Commission asked for briefs on the matter. The parties thereaf-
ter asked for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose cf develop-
ing the record to describe the nature cf their respective busi-
ness operations as a basic for resolving the jurisdictional 
issue. Said hearing took place on November 7, 1983, at the hour 
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of 2:00 p.m., before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge 
for the Commission. Evidence was offered and received, and the 
Administrative Law Judge, having considered the same, together 
with the briefs submitted, new enters the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order based thereon. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Page America of Utah, Inc., hereafter called "Appli-
cant" is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of 
the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City, 
Utah. It is a subsidiary of Page America Group, Inc., a holding 
company with operating companies in a large number of states 
nationwide. Applicant's position is supported by American 
Paging, Inc., appearing as amicus curiae, hereafter called 
"American," a corporation qualified to do business in the state 
of Utah, and which is already operating a paging service, though 
without certification from this Commission. The application is 
opposed by David R. Williams, cba Industrial Communications, 
hereafter called "Industrial", and by Mobile Telephone, Inc., a 
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of 
Utah, hereafter called "MTI". The Division of Public Utilities 
also epposes the present motion of the Applicant for an exempt 
certificate, and instead asks the Commission to exercise limited 
regulatory oversight of pacing service, similar to that which we 
exercise over WATS resellers. 
2. Both of the protestants currently hold certificates of 
convenience and necessity from this Commission authorizing them 
CASE NO. 83-082-01 
- 3 -
to provide mobile radio-telephone service in various parts of the 
state, and in conjunction therewith to operate paging service as 
well. The grants of authority have been made at various times, 
and with a single exception have provided for authority to 
operate both mobile telephone and paging service. In 1974, the 
Commission issued a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of 
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation is not a Protestant in 
this case) in Case No. 6969 which dealt exclusively with the 
provision of paging service, and the Protestants cite that case 
to the Commission as determinitive that the Commission has 
already decided the jurisdictional issue herein. In one case, to 
be discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert jurisdiction 
over such service, but that case was reversed by the Utah Supreme 
Court, and in view of the Court's disposition of the same, we do 
not consider ourselves bound by it. As we will discuss hereaf-
ter, we do not believe that the Supreme Court has ruled in 
respect to the Commission's jurisdiction over paging services. 
3. Paging technology has been developing extremely rapidly 
over the past ten to fifteen years. Prior to that time, substan-
tially the only method people had of ensuring that they be 
apprised of all calls when they were away from the phone, was to 
employ an answering service. The calling party would leave a 
message with the answering service, to be relayed when the 
customer of the answering service phoned in to get the messages. 
There was no way to let the customer know immediately when a 
message had been left. 
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4. The first electronic improvement was a tone-only 
"beeper". This was an electronic device which could be activated 
by a radio signal from the answering service providing a high-
pitch tone to alert the customer that a message was waiting. The 
most prinitive form of this system involves a human activating 
the beeper and giving the customer a message when the customer 
phones in. In almost all cases this primitive system has been 
superseded by a machine which automatically activates the beeper 
and then plays back the caller's message when the customer phones 
in* 
5. The next advance in technology was to provide "tone-two 
address" service which would enable a customer, by the type of 
the tone, to discern which of two numbers to call to get mes-
sages. This type of service has in turn been superseded by "tone 
and voice" service, which allows a person to hear the message 
after the beeper is activated, thus sparing the necessity of 
phoning in to get messages. Now on the horizon are two further 
advances in the technology: digital display (already available) 
which will display the message in numeric form, obviously in most 
cases directing the customer which telephone number to call to 
reach the caller. Digital display is already available in many 
parts of the country and has very recently been introduced in the 
Salt Lake market. It is likely to be superseded quite scon by an 
"alpha-numeric" display which will enable the customer to receive 
a short written message as well as numeric data. 
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6. It is new foreseeable that in the near future the 
alpha-numeric display will enable the customer to use the ser-
vices of a "network," which will link him to data bases, and will 
enable him to use his service nationwide. The Applicant and 
American are each involved in establishing such a network. Hone 
of the existing certificated carriers in Utah have taken concrete 
steps in such a direction. 
7. Despite the rapid advances in th£ technology, and the 
potential for greater usefulness, the essential structure of the 
service remains the same. A caller uses th|e telephone system to 
reach the service and leave a message. The message is stored. 
There is then a retransmission, either to aiert the customer that 
there is a message, or to send it directly |for voice or display. 
The retransmission may or may not involve use of the land lines. 
The service requires, by way of equipment, £ome means of answer-
ing the calls, stcring the messages, transmitting the alert 
signal, and replaying the stored message. The only part which 
must be done electronically is the transmission of the alert 
signal. Obviously, a manual system for the other part of the 
operation would be intolerably cumbersome, and hence automated 
equipment to handle these aspects has been available for some 
time. Although this renders the establishment of such a system 
expensive, nevertheless, if one compares the capital of such an 
operation with that required for a land line telephone system, or 
similar fixed utility, they are relatively npdest. Furthermore, 
the operation of such a system does not invqlve the installation 
F.-S 
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and maintenance of a wide-spread, expensive physical distribution 
system. 
8. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has al-
located two primary bands for paging service. One, commonly 
known as the "high band," lies around 900 MHz. "Low band" lies 
around 35 and 43 MHz. The FCC has recently allocated 68 addi-
tional channels for the "high band" and 28 channels in the "low 
band". Between them, the two bands have had only eight channels 
heretofore. The FCC has also considerably liberalized its 
criteria for granting new licenses on these bands. 
9. In the wake of the FCC allocation of additional chan-
nels, and relaxation of licensing requirements, there has been a 
perceptible trend in a number of states toward relaxing regu-
lation of paging services, or deregulating them altogether. 
10. At present, the Applicant's subsidiaries in a number of 
other states are offering tone and voice paging, digital paging, 
and in some cases alpha-numeric paging. They propose to offer 
all forms immediately, should they be granted authority, with the 
possible exception of alpha-numeric, which may be delayed slight-
ly for technical reasons. They also propose to offer network 
paging as soon as it is available. American offers the same 
present capabilities, and proposes the same future service. MTI 
presently offers all forms except alpha-numeric. MTI has begun 
investigating possible network affiliation, but has no concrete 
plans at present. Industrial can presently offer tone, and tone 
and voice. It has the technical capabilities of offering 
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digital, but at present has no frequencies available to it for 
that purpose. It expects they will be available, and it proposes 
to offer such service as soon as it is possible, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . The issue turns upon the construction of Utah Code 
Annotated 54-2-1 (22) , which gives regulatory jurisdiction to the 
Commission over telephone corporations as defined therein. An 
integral part of that definition incorporates a separate defini-
tion of a "telephone line" which U.C.A. 54-2-1 (21) defines to be 
"all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, 
instruments and appliances, and all other 
real estate and fixtures and personal proper-
ty owned, controlled, operated, or managed in 
connection with or to facilitate communica-
tion by telephone whether such communication 
is had with or without the use of trans-
mission wires." 
2. Because the Utah statute uses the terms "facilitate 
communication by telephone whether such communication is had with 
or without the use of transmission wires," it simply is not clear 
that the Legislature specifically intended to include one-way 
paging service within the regulatory jurisdiction of this Commis-
sion. In construing its jurisdiction as a matter of first 
impression, the Commission first considers the plain meaning of 
the underlying statute. Where the statute is ambiguous, as here, 
we examine the decisions of courts for guidance in construing the 
law; and where reasonably direct guidance is lacking in author-
itative case law, we endeavor to apply a prudent judgment ground-
ed in our regulatory experience which takes into account the 
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philosophical and economic bases for affording certain enter-
prises the unique status of regulated monopolies, as well as 
considerations of public interest in receiving necessary utility 
service• The parties in this matter have referred the Commission 
to many cases from our own and other states, some of which have 
opted for a regulatory plan for paging service, and some which 
have not. The weight of case authority is split, and we are 
persuaded by our review of Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court 
has never squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over 
paging service, 
3. In the 1974 'Mcbile Telephone Service of Southern Utah 
case (No. 6969) , the Commission granted a paging certificate; 
however, two facts are significant with respect to that decision. 
First, the application does net appear to have been contested, 
and therefore the issue of jurisdiction was net argued before the 
Commission in an adversarial context. Second, the Commission made 
no findings nor conclusions from which it may be inferred that 
the issue of jurisdiction was ever fully considered, and for 
whatever reason, the Commission failed to declare that it had 
jurisdiction to issue the certificate. We conclude as a matter 
of law that the Commission had no such jurisdiction, and that the 
order in that case was null and void. We further conclude that 
the inclusion of paging service in any certificates issued by the 
Commission, authorizing the holders to provide mcbile telephone 
service, was error, and that the portions of orders conferring 
authority to provide paging service are null and void. 
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4. Protestants refer to the Commission's Order In the 
Matter of 
Medic-Call 
the 
, a 
Investiaaticn 
corporation, 
Exchance Answerino Service ar 
- ~ • .I - - - - — 
c 
H 
id 
f the 
arold 
Practices 
Jensen, 
and 
M.D. , 
ODerations of 
Professional 
Industrial Ccmmunications Company, 
Investigation Docket No. 120 (1969), in support of the proposi-
tion that this Commission has already squarely faced and decided 
the issue of its jurisdiction over paging services. However, as 
we see it, the debate in that proceeding was over the question of 
whether or not Medic-Call was offering its service to the public 
generally, whereas, in the instant proceeding the debate is over 
different questions, one of which is whether or not a paging 
service is a telephone corporation within the meaning of our 
statutes. We note that in Medic-Call v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 258 (1970), which is the appeal of 
the Commission1s Order in Investigation Docket No. 120, the Court 
in its opinion merely assumes arguendo that'a paging service is a 
telephone corporation: here we cannot so assume. 
It is also worthwhile to note the rather stinging dicta of 
the Court in Medic-Call: 
"The service (paging service) is compa-
rable to that which would be rendered by 
runners or call boys to notify doctors that 
they were wanted on the phone. One wonders 
just how the defendant would go about reg-
ulating the service even if it had the power 
to do so. If defendants can regulate the 
service rendered by plaintiffs herein, could 
they not with equal propriety regulate the 
semaphore signaling of the Boy Scouts or the 
smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting 
expedition?" (at page 260, 470 P.2d) 
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Protestants cite the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Hvrum Gibbons & Sens Co., 602 P.2d 684 (1979), to 
demonstrate that the term "telephone line" includes the plant, 
equipment and facilities used to provide paging services. In 
Williams the Court construed the meaning of "telephone line" but 
did so by stating only that the phrase included "radio-telephone 
communications." The Williams case presented the issue to the 
Court in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, and the 
question of whether plaintiff had condemnation powers required a 
finding that the plaintiff was in fact a public utility. The 
business of the plaintiff for which eminent domain had been 
sought was to install a transmitter to operate radio telephone 
and paging service. The Court didn't specify that paging is to 
be treated within the definition of a "telephone line" but relied 
mere generally on "radio-telephone communications" as failing 
within the broad definition ("whether with or without trans-
mission wires11) without identifying services which constitute 
radio-telephone communications. Clearly, mobile telephone 
service is within the meaning of the statute, and the case can be 
said to stand for that; however, we conclude that the nature of 
pacing service is so fundamentally distinct and different frcm 
mobile telephone service that the Court's language in that case 
falls short of declaring paging to be a telephone line. 
We read the fleeting references to paging service in the 
cases to mean that paging has been a distinctly separate service 
which companies have offered adjunctively to their customers 
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because the service can technologically dovetail with mobile 
telephone service? but the two are not the same in fact, nor 
should they be treated the same in law. 
5. The distinction between paging ancj telephone service is 
critical because if in defining "telephone line" one focuses on 
the phrase "facilitate telephone communicition," the scope of 
potentially regulated services becomes staggering. Conceivably 
the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone 
equipment, e.g. Radio Shack, Sears, J.C.Penney, Panasonic? 
suppliers of wiring components? all suppliers of telephone 
directories, including the many not affiliated with the Bell 
system? telephone answering services, telephone answering devices 
and all such suppliers? radio talk stations?i newspaper classified 
advertising, cad absurdum. The focus instead should be on the 
connotation of telephone service which implies interactive, and 
at least potentially extended two-way commlunication. That was 
certainly the focus in 1917 when the statute was enacted, since 
most of the services new technologically feasible were not 
foreseen at that time. Paging service is conceptually no differ-
ent from answering services (which have n^ver been considered 
appropriate objects of state regulation)? itj is the same service 
offered through a different medium. Telephone service over land 
lines or radio waves is fundamentally the same service irrespec-
tive of the means of transmission. But telephone service is a 
two-way service? paging service is one-way c4ll notification. 
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6. Finally, we consider it appropriate to evaluate paging 
service in the context of the traditional characteristics which 
have warranted granting of a state-regulated monopoly. Histor-
ically, legislatures have narrowly circumscribed the conditions 
which justify such a departure from a free market economy. Those 
conditions have generally included the providing of a service 
which is deemed necessary and essential to the citizenry, the 
existence of natural mcnopolies because of significant capital 
investment necessary to achieve economies of scale in production, 
and the efficient use of minimally intrusive rights of way across 
land. An objective analysis of paging service persuades us to 
conclude the following: 
(a) Paging is a valuable convenience for a small but 
growing number of pecple. Industrial presented information to 
the effect that it has the capacity to serve 200,000 paging 
subscribers, but presently serves approximately 2,500 subscrib-
ers. While paging is beneficial and efficient in aiding instant 
response to telephone calls, we cannot say that the service is a 
necessary public service in the sense that water, electricity, 
natural gas and basic telephone service are necessary to the 
well-being of the citizenry, nor can it be said that a signifi-
cant number of telephone customers avail themselves of the 
service. 
(b) The capital necessary to provide paging service is net 
substantival compared to the capital commitments common to other 
utility services* 
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(c) The public is not inconvenienced by the plant or 
transmission of paging signals in the way it would be inconve-
nienced by unlimited electric companies seeking transmission 
rights of way. Whether there are three or three hundred paging 
companies, the intrusion upon land would be tninimal. 
(d) Paging may have been a service in short supply because 
the FCC imposed severe limits to market entry by restricting 
frequencies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC decision to 
release 96 new frequencies significantly alters the supply 
consideration and represents a major federal policy to liberalize 
market access and foster competition in the paging industry. 
(e) If competition can produce serviqe and price benefits 
to paging customers, there would appear io be no substantial 
reason for this Commission to exercise jurisdiction. Cerrainiy 
there would be obvious advantages to the Protestants if marker 
entry were restricted, but the purpose of s^ate regulation isn't 
to protect the interests of regulated companies for their own 
sake; it is to protect the public interest. Conceivably, there 
will be many market entrants, and it is likely that seme will 
flourish and some will fail. We see no significant risk to the 
public if some providers fail, and we are petsuaded that the open 
market will in time be the best safeguard of the public interest, 
both in terms of price and service. 
(f) The Protestants urge the Commission to assert jurisdic-
tion to preclude duplication of facilities * but duplication is 
the essence of competition, and such a policy would be rational 
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only if the investment necessary to launch a paging service were 
vastly greater than it is. 
7. The issues raised herein demonstrate that it is an 
appropriate time to request that our Legislature modernize the 
definition of telephone service. The questions in this case, as 
well as the the Commission's decision to assert limited regulatc-
ry oversight of WATS resellers, and the restructuring of the 
telephone industry incident to the break-up of the Bell System 
merit a careful evaluation of what ought to be regulated and what 
cannot be regulated in order to better serve the communication 
requirements of Utahns. We are attempting to crunch the tech-
nology of 1983 into the terminology of 1917, and there are too 
many technological and economic developments to make ambiguous 
definitions advisable or workable. 
Accordingly, we make the following Order: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the application 
of Page America of Utah, Inc. be, and the same hereby is, dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Tele-
phone, Inc., Certificate No. 1414 issued in Case No. 5169, 
insofar as the same purports to grant authority for paging 
service be, and the same hereby is, hereby amended to delete 
therefrom any reference to paging service, and that a copy cf 
this Order be filed and made effective in said case; and 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No. 1504 issued in Case No. 5482 to David R. Williams, 
dba Industrial Communications, be, and the same hereby is, 
amended to delete therefrom any reference to mobile paging 
service; and that a copy of this Order be filed and made effec-
tive in said case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Tele-
phone Service of Southern Utah Inc. , Certificate No. 1856 issued 
in Case No. 6969, insofar as the same grants authority for paging 
service, is hereby voided, and that a copy of this Order be filed 
and made effective in said case. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ?8th day of November, 
1983. 
/s/ A. Robert Thurman, 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 28th day of November, 1982, as 
the Report and Order of the Commission. 
I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) I si David R. Irvine, Commissioner 
Is/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Is/ Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary 
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Brent H. Cameron 
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Joe Dunlop 
May 16, 19 86 
RULE ON ONE-WAY PAGING SERVICES, Case No. 86-99Q-0* 
nd adoption of the one-way paging rule effective today. 
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ADDENDUM G 
_ T^ ppf\t>p rHRrI^ PUBLIC ST7"r?T7Tr,F COMMISSION O17 HTA" -
In the Matter of the Applica- ) 
tion of AMERICAN PAGING*, INC. > 
(OF UTAH) for a Certificate o* ) 
Convenience and Necessity to ) CASE ^0. 8 5-2007-01 
Operate as a Public Utility ) 
Rendering Paging Service to the ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
General Public in Areas of Box ) TO DISMISS 
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, ) 
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch) 
and Tooele Counties, Utah. ) 
TSSUFD: Vav 23, 1936 
By the Commission: 
On or about August 10, 1933, Page America Inc. filed an 
application with the Commission to provide one-way paging ser-
vice. On November 28, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that 
it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services. The case 
was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (Ameri-
can Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide 
one-way paging service to the general public between points in 
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch 
and Tooele Counties within that area. American Paging filed 
simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason 
that the Commission, in its Order of November 28, 1983, had 
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way 
paging services. American Paging also stated that although the 
1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding 
Chapter 8b. empowering the Commission to wholly or partially 
exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service 
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providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission's jurisdic-
tion beyond that which it already had. 
On or about March 4, 19 86, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the Commissionfs deregulation of one-wav paging was defec-
tive because the Commission had attempted the deregulation 
through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through 
rulemaking under the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Thereafter, in accord with the instruction of the 
Supreme Court, the Commission filed a notice of proposed rule-
makina with the O^ice of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986, 
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over 
one-wav paging and the reasons for it. Notice was provided to 
the parties. No party requested a hearing within the 15-day 
period following publication as required by the Utah Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act. The rule was formally adopted and made 
effective May 16, 1986. 
The Commission further concludes from the comments and 
oral arguments o^ the parties that Chapter 8B of the Public 
Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction 
of the Commission to include one-way paging. 
Based upon the ^oregoing, the Commission will make the 
following: 
ORDE^ 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commis-
sion, having issued a rule pursuant to the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act and in accord with the direction of the Utah 
ra^P ^o. 85-2007-01 
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Supreme Court that it does not have jurisdiction over one-way 
paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of 
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the 
Commission tc include one-way paging, hereby grants American 
Paging !s Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of May, 
1986. 
Georgia fe. Peterson 
Executive Secretary 
JL-±± \ 
/ 
Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
Ja%s M. Byrne, Commissioner 
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In the Matter o^ the Application 
of AMERICAN PAGING, INC. (OF UTAH* 
for a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity to Operate as a 
Public Utility Rendering Paging 
Service to the General Public in 
Areas of Box Elder, Weberf Morgan, 
Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, 
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ORDER GPA^IMC MOTION TO DISMTSS 
Countv o^ Salt Lake ) 
State of Utah 
^ SS, 
Brenda Warner, being dulv sworn, deposes and says that she is a secretary regularly 
employed in the office of the Public Service Ccrrnission o^ Utah, whose office is 
located at 160 East 300 South, fourth Floor, Feber M. Wells State Office Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That there is a United States Post Office at Salt Lake City, and at the place of 
residence or place of business of the persons whose names are set forth below; and 
between Salt Lake City and residence or places of business, there is a regular 
ccmnunieation by mail. 
That on the 23rd day of May, 1986, affiant served a true copy of the hereto attached 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS on the said persons by mailing such copy on said 
date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the following persons, 
at the addresses shavn: 
* Stuart Poelman 
10 Exchange Place 
P.O. Box 3000 
SLC, UT 84110 
-Ocv 
Bryan L. McDougal 
Judge Building, Ste 735 
8 East Broadway 
SLC, UT 841H-
Also attached mailing list 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this 23rd day of May, 1986. 
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